So why does the notion persist that coercive and torturous methods are effective? There is obviously no way of doing research that involves actual torture. There is also a view that not using torture may make countries look weak — despite evidence to the contrary. As a consequence, many governments have pushed on with torture with little regard for efficacy — believing that doing something is better than nothing.
Over the past five years or so years, scientific evidence for alternative approaches has begun to emerge. Our recent study has identified a conversational approach known as controlled cognitive engagement that we believe may be highly effective for gathering intelligence. In a complex series of experiments, we recruited participants to attend a research session we claimed would be about decision making.
But, on arrival, they witnessed an aggressive interaction between a male researcher and a female student, played by actors, during which the student accidentally damaged a laptop.
The incident was developed so that participants would feel sympathy with the student. The researchers behind the study then claimed they wanted to do a spontaneous follow-up interview study on the spot, based on the incident.
We made use of framing, a cognitive bias where people decide on options based on whether outcomes are presented as losses or gains. The idea, which comes from prospect theory , was originally designed for use in aviation security. The approach has now been carefully modified for human intelligence gathering by framing persuasive messages. Even when the source is willing to collaborate, torture makes it more difficult [27] because stressors employed during it, such as sleep deprivation, suffocation and chronic strain, for example, affect memory, cognition and capacity to recall information.
Torture also increases the likelihood of the subject incorporating information contained in the leading questions, [28] thus providing unintentional false leads.
Taking those points into consideration, studies indicate that coercive interrogations tend to elicit unreliable intelligence more than they do a useful one.
Torture also has corrosive effects on organisations, as the leadership focus on results will allow space for increasing brutality and circumvention of checks and balances.
Finally, torture hinders intelligence activity in the longer term. It breaks social networks, [33] which makes non-coercive intelligence collection harder, diverts effort from potentially more reliable methods of interrogation [34] such as rapport-building and information gathering interviews, [35] and hampers efforts to build diplomatic, political and military alliances. Even with plenty of evidence on the inefficacy of torture and its pervasive negative effects, many democratic governments have tried to legitimise and control the practice.
France then responded with a counterinsurgency operation that was the first in any modern democratic state to allow torture explicitly.
This unquestionable success has been historically tied to the supposedly superior intelligence gathered through torture and is used by apologists as the staple case of why the practice works. However, accounts from the French torturers themselves describe that the technique not only de-professionalised soldiers and fragmented French military institutions but also produced intelligence that was inferior to those obtained through other practices.
The main findings were that the use of EITs was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence, as multiple detainees fabricated information or refused to cooperate.
Due to its lack of efficiency, the whole program rested on inaccurate claims made by the CIA on its effectiveness. It was also uncovered that the torture applied was far more brutal and the conditions of confinement far harsher than what had been portrayed to the government, and that techniques that were not authorised had been applied to a greater extent of detainees than officially reported. It was also pointed out that the Central Agency had been actively dodging oversight by democratic institutions such as the Congress and the White House.
Both cases highlighted above prove through empiric experience that allowing torture, even under the guise of exceptionalism and governmental control, is not effective.
As the French and US cases show, once institutionalised, the use of torture will grow, institutions will erode, and the negative outcomes will far exceed the benefits reaped from intelligence that is nevertheless unreliable.
As seen above, the realist and consequentialist ethical views on torture, which legitimise the practice, allow states to implement torture programmes. Furthermore, allowing torture even under extreme circumstances sets a dangerous precedent, as those who are willing to broaden the application of the technique will exploit any legal permission to do so, [52] as was shown by the French and US cases. Additionally, torture is an inefficient way to gather intelligence, as it elicits unreliable information, generates time-consuming false leads, and produces cognitive effects that impair collection even when the sources are willing to collaborate.
The technique also has a corrosive impact on organisations, increasing brutality and resistance to democratic oversight. Finally, torture is detrimental to intelligence per se, as it breaks social networks, undermines non-coercive collection, diverts effort from more reliable methods of interrogation, taints the public perception of intelligence and hampers efforts to build alliances.
Thus, as there is no ethical justification for the practice nor proof of its unparalleled effectiveness, much on the contrary, there should be an absolute legal ban on torture.
Banham, Cynthia. Hart Publishing, Bellaby, Ross W. Duke, Misty C. Duke, Misty, and Damien Van Puyvelde. Erskine, Toni. Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering. Evans, Rebecca. Feinstein, Dianne, and United States. Donate Now. Take Action. Join Us. Give Now. Your tax deductible gift can help stop human rights violations and save lives around the world. More Reading. December 9, News Release. October 31, Report. December 1, Report.
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