This meant that Khrushchev was willing to take the risk of placing intermediate-range ballistic missiles on Cuba in In , Khrushchev had met Kennedy at the Vienna Summit to discuss nuclear proliferation and the situation in Berlin. Khrushchev noted Kennedy was young and good-natured, but inexperienced.
This led him to believe that he could manipulate and intimidate Kennedy. His father, a clerk in the navy pay office, was Mamie Snow, a mentally disabled white woman from Waukegan, Illinois, claims that James Montgomery, a Black veteran and factory worker, raped her.
Montgomery, who was promptly thrown in jail, spent more than 25 years in prison before his conviction was overturned and he was Sherman begins his expedition across Georgia by torching the industrial section of Atlanta and pulling away from his supply lines. After 16 months of debate, the Continental Congress, sitting in its temporary capital of York, Pennsylvania, agrees to adopt the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union on November 15, Not until March 1, would the last of the 13 states, Maryland, ratify the Live TV.
This Day In History. History Vault. World War I. While there are at least folk memories and socio-economic histories available concerning life in the emergent capitalism of pre Russia—for whatever value they may hold—there is virtually nothing to guide the Russians'. Ostrogorsky's "profound insights," suggests Starr, "justify his being ranked after Alexis de Tocqueville and Sir James Bryce as the most sensitive foreign observer of this country" "The Russian View of America," The Wilson Quarterly 1, no.
Curiously, however, though originally published in English in , and in French the following year, this work has never been published in the Russian language. The USA Institute has, as one of its major tasks, the responsibility of filling this intellectual and informational void. And its researchers have spent long hours pouring through the American press and magazines, professional journals and transcripts of congressional hearings, reading American history and biography, interviewing U.
Given the handicaps with which they began—and the constraints which domestic political considerations still impose—the results have been surprisingly good.
There are, to be sure, blind spots and rigidities, as we shall explain. It must be recognized, however, that Soviet perceptions of the American political system have notably improved. Both to indicate the degree to which Soviet thinking has changed and as groundwork for a later discussion of American political dynamics, a brief sortie into political-economic doctrine seems useful. The basic character of the U. According to this view, the power of large "monopolies" is united with that of the state, hence the label "state-monopoly capitalism.
In this union the state occupies not an independent but a subordinate position. The state, in this view, is the tool and the servant of the dominant economic interests, to whose purposes the machinery and processes of government—and society as a whole—are bent.
Following Lenin's. To utilize state power more effectively, the tycoons of finance capital had themselves appointed as ministers, heads of important departments, ambassadors and prominent officials. The state machinery and the monopolies are so intertwined that it is often difficult to determine the boundary between them.
All agencies and processes of the democratic state—government office, parties, the press, the legislature—are at best trappings serving to obscure the dominance of big business. In the United States, Lenin wrote, "The stock exchange is everything, while parliament and elections are marionettes. Lenin, as we shall see, did speak of divisions and disagreement within the ruling circles of capitalism, a condition which gave rise on occasion to serious debate over questions of foreign policy.
This observation admitted at least the possibility of some meaningful political life under capitalism. It was the prevailing wisdom of the Stalin period, however, that capitalist governments were dominated by an essentially united oligarchy of finance capitalists—Wall Street. Stalin thus denied the possibility of autonomy to the sphere of politics or to the state itself. In his view the capitalist state was in the hands of the corporate interests and not vice versa.
The orthodox view, therefore, is based on crude economic determinism, according to which the economic base dominated by big business determines the political superstructure, whose prime purpose it is to strengthen the base.
Thus the agencies of the federal government, the Congress, the courts as well as the political parties, elections, and the media are all seen to be mere pawns serving the interests of their bourgeois masters. There are, in this view, no politically significant differences or conflicts either among the major corporations or within the state apparatus subordinated to them. This system of dictatorial class rule is seen to be essentially reactionary and aggressive.
Operating under direct instructions from monopoly capital, the American government is viewed as inherently hostile. The imperialist elite, recognizing the threat which socialism poses to its class interests, seeks to use the state to wage total war against the Soviet Union. The essence of this position was ably captured in.
And in this view Soviet diplomacy is largely powerless to temper such deeply-rooted hostility. Since the death of Stalin such primitive formulations have been significantly modified. As earlier studies have indicated, [5] Soviet analysts have in the past two decades moved considerably beyond these crude interpretations. It must be noted, however, that such views are not completely absent. They are frequently found in the popular press and, on occasion, even in the writings of eminent Soviet Americanists.
Thus, for example, Anatoly Gromyko has written that. The president of the United States, the venerable senators, the smartest members of the House of Representatives and the entire bureaucratic apparatus are, in fact, in the service of the monopolists. Monopoly capital is the main and decisive force which controls American foreign policy. Gromyko goes on to say that it is perfectly natural that leading American diplomats "are close in their views to those of their bosses, the American monopolists.
Frequently they are offended when they are called 'servants of capital'. Facts, however, are stubborn things. American monopolies exert a constant influence on the government apparatus that is intertwined with them along an infinite number of channels at various levels. Many government departments operating. Corporate influence on government policy, he writes, is also transmitted directly.
By means of connections at the very top—through participation in special presidential commissions and task-forces or, less formally, by their presence at unofficial dinners and meetings at the White House—corporate executives "convey the main pulses from the principal groupings of monopoly capital that affect government policy as a whole. The persistence of such views in the writings of Soviet Americanists has led some to conclude that, for all their awareness of fact and detail, their findings are nothing more than old wine in new bottles.
Such is not the case. Though the language often remains unchanged, the specific interpretation given to "state-monopoly capitalism" indicates a far better appreciation of contemporary American politics than such rhetoric would seem to allow. While analysts still remain loyal to basic doctrinal formulations, which they must, they have managed to cast them in a new, far less inhibiting light.
Though the rhetoric of "state-monopoly capitalism" is retained, its dynamics are today understood quite differently than during the heyday of Stalinist dogmatism.
A cardinal difference relates to the degree of internal cohesion thought to exist within the American ruling elite. Once regarded as essentially united, both in terms of views and interests, the American leadership is now seen to be internally divided. As one Soviet analyst has observed:. This is precisely the present state of affairs within the United States.
Thus the leadership of "state-monopoly capitalism" is now considered to be at odds with itself. Arbatov notes, for example, the existence of a considerable "struggle of opinion" in Washington regarding Soviet-American relations. There are, he suggests, three groups, viz. Clearly the dogmatic assumptions of the Stalin period are no longer accepted. As Soviet analysts frequently note, though all of the major political actors in the United States are committed to the existing socio-economic system, this unity of "class interest" does not eliminate differences—sometimes very significant ones—regarding the ways and means by which individual groups seek to achieve their purposes.
As we saw in the previous chapter, attitudes on both domestic and foreign especially defense policy have become increasingly differentiated. Various segments of the American leadership have taken differing positions on such policy issues as "reordering national priorities," economic planning, Vietnam, and the arms race.
According to another source, "internal instability" in the United States in recent years has generated "differences of opinion" within the American leadership regarding the best ways to overcome these "multifaceted" crises. The "prevailing view" is said to be "one which holds that the best way lies in 'tightening the screws.
At the same time," this writer notes, "there is a certain revival of reformist currents. Although the groups composing the American leadership are seen to be guided by the interests of their own class, they interpret these interests differently.
Nothing less than a "fierce struggle" is said to have been "going on for a long time" within the American leadership regarding jurisdiction over the continental shelf, the underseas territory immediately adjacent to the U. The dispute "has mainly been between military circles wishing to keep these boundaries close to the mainland and the oil monopolies taking the opposite position," that is, "in favor of a 'large shelf. In these circumstances, the role of the bourgeois state is significantly different from what it was earlier conceived to be.
In a June article on "U. Turkatenko, deputy editor of SShA , notes that. The state itself performs the function of coordinator of "streams of influence" originating from the corporations, and carries out legislative, economic, diplomatic, or military measures proceeding from the prevailing—either immediate or long-run—general interests of state monopoly capital as a whole.
Turkatenko's formulation focuses attention on the political sphere. Noting the existence of internal divergences and even conflicts of interest—hence the need for a "coordinator"—questions naturally arise regarding the various interests involved, alternative interpretations and leaderships, and the factors influencing policy choices, i. In contrast to the Stalinist "subordination" thesis, which held that the bourgeois state cannot act against the interests of the monopolists, who were themselves said to have maintained tight control of the state apparatus, Turkatenko recognizes the role of government as an autonomous political force.
If the function of the state is to protect the "long-term," "general" interests of the system "as a whole," the political leadership can embark on a course which conflicts with the "short-term," "narrow," interests of specific corporate groups.
The president, argues Petrovsky,. As the spokesman of the political will of the whole of monopoly capital. Soviet writers cite numerous examples of such presidential autonomy. In , for example, President Kennedy forced a rollback in steel prices—despite bitter opposition from the heads of the steel industry—out of concern for the impact of the price rise on the rest of the American economy.
For actions such as this, it is noted, Kennedy was in fact considered to be an "anti-business President," very much like President Roosevelt, who in his time was regarded as a "traitor to. Similar views are expressed concerning several other recent presidents—Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and Richard Nixon who, as we have seen, substantially modified the course of American defense and foreign policy, despite opposition from the "military-industrial complex".
In the words of N. Yakovlev, such leaders "imposed strict discipline and sacrifice that was sometimes considerable for the sake of the higher interests of the capitalist class. The role of the political leadership is now considered to be clearly of prime importance. Though Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy and Nixon were all "guided by the interests of their class," they held distinctive views as to how these interests could best be served and were in a position to act on their beliefs.
The particular policy orientation of individual political leaders, therefore, can be decisive. Such non-dogmatic assessments, viz. A number of scholars have convincingly demonstrated that many of the basic notions extant today regarding "state-monopoly capitalism" had their origin in earlier periods. Lenin himself, as indicated previously, recognized divisions and disagreements within the ruling circles of capitalism.
He saw, in particular, the existence of several tendencies within Western leadership circles. In addition to hard-line anti-Soviet groups of various hues there were those elements interested mainly in improving world trade. Finally, in all bourgeois countries, a pacifist, liberal tendency was seen to be present. Soviet diplomacy, he urged, could not afford to ignore such differences within the adversary camp. He viewed the Tsarist state as "balancing between opposing interests representing to a certain degree a self-sufficient politically organized force.
Though Stalin consistently placed his main emphasis on the "subordination thesis," which insisted that the bourgeois state is subordinate to the most powerful economic interests, namely the omnipotent financial oligarchy, a number of Soviet analysts in the early postwar period revived the Leninist interpretation.
Led by the ranking economist, Evgenii Varga, they pointed to the existence of disagreements within, for example, the Japanese ruling class between the military and financial interests. Varga argued that the state often acts in the interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole. Referring to the experience of Western governments during World War II, he suggested that, in order to ensure victory, the capitalist state had to take measures directed against some monopolist groupings. Such interpretations of "state-monopoly capitalism" and their advocates did not fare well.
Hewing close to Stalin's rigid formulas, militant elements in the Communist Party in the late s and early s denounced Varga and his colleagues. However, during the Khrushchev period and since, such analyses have received renewed attention. As we noted earlier, primitive views are still to be found in the Soviet literature on the United States. Nonetheless, "statemonopoly capitalism" is now being interpreted in relatively sophisticated terms.
Though the evolution of Soviet thinking described briefly here can be seen as a return to earlier modes of thought, more is involved. To the extent that they have again become aware that, in Arbatov's phrase, "the superstructure can have a relatively independent role," [22] Soviet analysts at the USA Institute have studied its operations with considerable care. Their judgements and understanding of this "superstructure," the institutions and processes of the U.
It is to these that we now turn. In contrast to the formulations of the Stalin era, which saw American policy as the product of a cabal, worked out in the board. It would be naive to assume, writes Arbatov, that there exists "as in the military sphere. In the formation of American foreign policy, writes Inozemtsev, a "big role" is played by "individual statesmen at the highest levels of the official hierarchy this applies especially to the president, who.
While the constitutional authority of the president is recognized, it is not seen to be without constraints. And, in the judgment of Yuri Shvedkov, they are considerable. The problem in his view is essentially bureaucratic, i. This phenomenon, he writes, has made the job of implementing foreign policy "increasingly difficult. Frequently, implementation of decisions taken becomes bogged down in interdepartmental labyrinths.
Also at times they are met with open defiance by some governmental departments which, because of alliances with powerful forces on Capitol Hill—and elsewhere—have been able to attain "a certain autonomy. In his analysis of the Kennedy administration, Anatoly Gromyko cites numerous instances of bureaucratic opposition and resistance to presidential authority. Nevertheless, throughout his analysis, Gromyko stresses that ultimate authority to make decisions was in the hands of the president, that nothing happened without his approval and that he always had to be persuaded and was never dictated to.
That there was intense pressure brought to bear on him by "militaristic" groups only reinforces this point. Though Kennedy's decision not to allow American forces directly to participate in the Bay of Pigs invasion "aroused strong resentment within the CIA and the Pentagon," his orders were carried out. When an American U-2 plane was shot down, "the supporters for war again demanded the implementation of an air attack on Cuba followed by an invasion.
Kennedy again rejected their demands. The president, in Gromyko's view, is in control. Once Kennedy had firmly decided that a certain course was the correct one, regardless of the pressure to the contrary, he stood fast and, more importantly, his decision was implemented. Shvedkov points out that Kennedy's decision to withdraw medium-range American missiles from Turkey "was not implemented for several months because of delays by the State Department and the Department of Defense.
Despite considerable opposition and counterpressure, Kennedy decided to meet with "the head of the Soviet government" in Vienna. In a striking display of Soviet political etiquette, Gromyko avoids direct reference to the former Soviet leader. Having been removed from office in disgrace, Khrushchev became a "non-person.
The president, in Gromyko's judgement, has overwhelming independent power. The generally accepted view of the scope of presidential authority is set forth in an earlier work by Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism.
Here he writes that, as chief of state and head of government, the president must "unconditionally be given first place" as an influence on foreign policy. He "possesses such great. In this process dozens, if not hundreds, of people and numerous state institutions take part.
The president, it would seem, can exercise considerable initiatives only in particular instances. He has especially great authority in periods of great crisis. According to Zhurkin, "the last word in making decisions in international crisis situations rests with the president. The old rule that 'crisis is the president's show' still holds. Having asserted this as a general rule, Soviet writers again and again come back to the exceptional cases—FDR, Kennedy and Nixon—presidents who were able to surmount bureaucratic and economic pressures and take independent, i.
Roosevelt, writes Ernst Genri,. He, of course, nourished no special sympathy for Soviet or socialist ideas. At no time did Roosevelt stand apart from the bourgeois society in which he was born and raised. But the democratic traditions of T. Jefferson and A. Lincoln were alive in him; he sincerely hated fascism and understood that a victory by Hitler would threaten the world. FDR's "farsightedness," his "instinctive presentiment of the future" led him to support a "realistic" foreign policy, i.
Yakovlev, "lies in the fact that he was able to overcome a certain inertia among U. Soviet treatment of the Kennedy Administration is of the same cloth.
Kennedy was mistrusted by many, writes Gromyko, precisely because they feared that he "might become a new Roosevelt. The 'ghost of Roosevelt' has always frightened" those on the "right" both for his domestic policies and because he normalized relations with the Soviet Union. They feared Kennedy would seek to do the same. Furthermore, unlike "Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson [who] preferred in general not to go against the current," Kennedy proposed numerous measures which "were to a considerable degree at variance with the ideas prevailing in the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA.
Though "confronted with mounting pressure from the U. Reactions to the foreign policies of the Nixon administration have been even more positive.
Though initially apprehensive—and at times deeply troubled, as we shall see—Soviet analysts became increasingly enthusiastic after the Moscow summit. Since then President Nixon has been described quoting an American source as "the first president since Franklin Roosevelt to have recognized the legitimate interests of the USSR," [39] as having understood that, quoting Nixon himself, "every confrontation means coming into contact with the potential nuclear destruction of all civilized countries," [40] and in general for helping break the ice of the cold war, opening up broad prospects for Soviet-American relations and contributing to an improvement of the whole international atmosphere.
Nonetheless, it "bore to a certain extent and, of necessity the character of the president's 'personal course. Though at times somewhat muted—out of deference to American sensibilities regarding Watergate—the Americanists' high regard for the policies of the —74 period is unmistakable. What this literature suggests is that Soviet analysts place a great deal of weight on the personal qualities of individual presidents.
They point out, to be sure, that other elements—such as conservative circles within the governmental apparatus of which more in a moment and pressure from "right wing" forces in and outside the government—seek by various means, both fair and foul, to resist the moderate policies of thoughtful presidents.
In , for example, "reactionary circles" attempted to restrict the authority of future presidents to make policy decisions at their own discretion.
Fearful of another FDR, Shvedkov writes, they sought to tie the hands of all presidents:. The idea of setting up the National Security Council had something in common with the law limiting the president of the United States to an 8-year term of office adopted by the Congress at the same time. All of this reflected the desire of reactionary circles to prevent a man of independent views and broad capability.
The fact remains, however, that despite the efforts of such unenlightened elements, "sober," "realistic" political figures do manage somehow to emerge at the helm of the U. While the resistance and counterpressures they face are often considerable, Soviet observers continue to search for—and to find—American presidents who, by personal inclination and character, "exceed the bounds. While responsive, even sympathetic, to individual presidents, Soviet analysts have as a whole been less understanding of other basic features of the American political system.
They do not seem able to understand, for example, the principle of limited government, the rule of law, the separation of powers and majority rule. They have difficulty even conceptualizing the value we place on individual liberty, freedom of speech and the press, or the concern we have. Soviet obtuseness regarding fundamental American political principles is easily demonstrated.
Gusev, suggests that, according to the U. Criminal Code, were Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov an American citizen, "he might well find himself behind bars" for advocating and abetting the destruction of the regime. Even a leading Soviet jurist seems incapable of understanding that political criticism and dissent are not everywhere seen to be the same as treason.
As Marshall Shulman perceptively suggests, "it is difficult to grasp the workings of pluralistic power hierarchies if one has only experienced, and if the history of one's country has only known, autocracy. Soviet Americanists have made substantial attempts to understand the role of the U. As a result of these efforts they have become impressively knowledgeable, especially regarding the shifting moods of opinion on Capitol Hill.
Nonetheless, such knowledge as they have acquired reflects more an awareness of the specific ways various parts of the congressional machinery can affect particular policies than an appreciation of the legislative process itself. Soviet writers have become familiar, as one would expect, with the mechanics of congressional operations—the committee structure of both houses, areas of competence, hearings, voting procedures, vetoes and overrides and, recently, the impeachment procedure.
There is on occasion evidence of some degree of understanding of the functions of Congress. Shvetsov stresses the important role of congressional hearings. He writes: "Exercising the right to hold hearings and conduct inquiries, the committee has broad opportunities for a comprehensive discussion of foreign-policy problems. A thoughtful account was given of Senate hearings February—March on the Pentagon's proposal to enlarge its facilities at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, with fairly good coverage of the presentation made by the Defense Department.
Attention was, however, focused on the testimony of those opposed including, incidentally, CIA Director William Colby. Portnyagin, Colby. The author concludes on a positive note: as a result of the "stormy debates" in Congress in , advocates of the construction of an enlarged base on Diego Garcia "were defeated. Other Soviet commentary on congressional hearings, however, has been less enthusiastic. Anichkina, for example, points out that as part of his campaign against normalizing relations with the USSR, Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on Investigations held hearings in the spring and summer of to which "violent opponents of the Soviet Union and well-known 'cold war' ideologues British 'Sovietologists' W.
Laqueur and L. Labedz" were invited. Similarly ill-intentioned hearings were held by the House Internal Security Committee that November in which "notorious opponents of improved relations. Soviet regard for congressional hearings quite obviously depends on their thrust. When testimony and committee questioning run parallel to Soviet policy positions, e. When they take a contrary view, they are condemned as a tool of reaction.
At best, however, even when supportive of "realistic". Critical congressional hearings and even debates within Congress itself, writes Shvetsov, are used "to steer deep public dissatisfaction in a definite channel, to open valves so as to alleviate pressure from the dissatisfaction seizing the masses. Soviet disdain for parliamentary processes is clearly demonstrated in Ssh A discussions of the issue of presidential war powers.
Soviet analysts have, of course, endorsed congressional efforts "to restrict the uncontrolled activity of the president and to return to the Congress the role it has lost in matters concerning the use of armed forces abroad.
The latter, in particular, was seen as having "significantly reduced the capacity of the executive to conduct undeclared wars or conflicts not sanctioned by Congress. In light of their political heritage and the absence of any tradition of shared power, the basic constitutional issue underlying this legislation, i.
For Soviet Americanists, the only point of interest is the "reduced capacity"—for whatever technical reason—of the power of the president to employ military force. The question, in their mind, is political—what its policy implications are for the USSR—not constitutional. Given Soviet policy concerns, the Americanists virtually ignored the Case Amendment Such information, hitherto often unavailable, would strengthen the legislature's power over foreign policy. Since many of the understandings signed by President Nixon.
Commenting on the Case Amendment, one Soviet analyst stressed that the Senate's concern to limit the president's authority did not call into question the legitimacy of executive agreements as such.
This form of international obligation, he argued, "has become firmly established in American diplomatic usage. The same logic, not surprisingly, characterized the Soviet response to the Jackson Amendment. A congressional majority, organized by Senator Henry Jackson [D. Congress at the same time placed a limit upon credits available to the Soviet Union to purchase American equipment and technology. Though he endorsed, in principle, its reemergence as an important influence shaping U.
Shershnev, deputy director of the institute, as "irresponsible. The U. The issue here is hardly one of "presidential usurpation" but, more importantly, "is it good for the Soviet Union? Soviet obsession with their own policy interests helps explain their confusion regarding the Watergate affair and the resignation of President Nixon. Though applauding the constraints imposed by. Congress on the president's foreign-policy authority, the Amerikanisty never saw these initiatives in terms of a constitutional confrontation.
The growth of congressional restiveness in the face of an "imperial presidency" was generally ignored. Soviet analysts tended to the view that "The president and the Congress are indeed not competitors but rather partners working in one and the same direction. Soviet analysts refused to take seriously investigations by Senate and House committees headed by Senator Sam Ervin and Congressman Peter Rodino into presidential misdeeds. The possibility of presidential impeachment was hardly mentioned.
The reluctance throughout the crisis of Soviet observers, including those at the USA Institute, to deal with the basic issues involved in the Watergate affair persists to this day.
Not one article has yet appeared in Ssha directly focusing on the most extraordinary event in modern American political history, the resignation of the president of the United States. Two factors help explain this rather curious behavior. First, the Soviet leadership was undoubtedly shaken by the fall of Mr. Nixon, a man who was and remains much admired. Former Ambassador W. Averell Harriman reported in September , after a visit to Moscow, that Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev still thinks well of the former president and "doesn't understand what Nixon did in [relation to] Watergate" that forced his resignation.
Brezhnev] only thinks of the progress they made together. Much as the death of Roosevelt in coincided with the end of wartime cordiality in Soviet-American relations, so it has been feared that the fall of President Nixon symbolized a more difficult period ahead.
To avoid facing the implications of such an unpleasant contingency, they try to ignore it. Another source of difficulty lies in the fact that Soviet officials, as Mr. Brezhnev indicated, are simply unable to understand what the former president did, or could have done, that compelled him to resign. Soviet incomprehension on this issue reflects their own rather distinctive political assumptions.
By historical tradition and political ideology the Soviet people share an understanding of the concept of power and authority singularly different from that held in the United States.
As Philip E. Mosely perceptively observed:. One feature which strikes every foreigner who stays in the Soviet Union for a substantial length of time is the great respect, even awe, that is generally felt for power, for authority. Neither word exactly expresses the Russian word vlast' which means power so great that one cannot oppose it. It can, if one is skillful, be placated; if one is lucky, it can be hoodwinked; but it cannot be resisted, for there is no ground on which the isolated individual can take his stand.
Thus, in contrast to the American tradition, where "power is multiple, fragmented, temporary, limited and comprehensible," the Soviet people share a "notion of overarching power that is both absolute and legitimate.
The notion of power that is by nature absolute does not fit well with that of constitutional constraints. In the USSR the very concept of abuse of executive authority is virtually a contradiction in terms. It was only after his death that Stalin could be charged with somehow having exceeded his power. Even now, after the "illegal repressions" of the Stalin era have been repudiated, there remains, as Hedrick Smith points out, a considerable nostalgia for Stalin as the krepkii khozyain , the strong, boss.
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